it was revealed today that the maoist party's apparent 11th hour support for the new UML PM khanal was, in fact, the result of a nearly year-long series of secret negotiations between one faction of the maoist party and the UML. it was the result of a seven-point agreement, with several very contentious arrangements. this is all, to employ a technical term, bad news bears.
one thing that probably won't be covered in the international press, but is really important, is the way this whole incident embodies the factionalism that pervades the three major parties: UCPN-maoist, CPN-UML (united marxist-leninist), and NC (nepali congress). infighting among factions is a major reason for the chronic ineffectiveness of nepal's democratic government(s) since the early 1990's, and one of the original rallying cries of the maoist insurgency. at the moment, there are probably three major factions of the maoists, and 2-3 in the UML, depending on who's counting. the negotiation of the secret agreement by certain factions of each party can be seen as internal power plays by those factions, as well as a bid for control of government as a whole. this ktm post article gives a pretty good run down of the situation, although it's a little hard to follow if you're not familiar with the players.
the factionalism in play also makes this deal even more precarious than it already otherwise clearly is. as this other ktm post article describes, dahal and khanal have agreed to "clarify" the meaning of the seven points, under pressure from the opposition parties. they are ALSO under pressure from their respective parties to stand firm by the points as articulated (dahal's maoists) and to hedge their asses off (khanal's UML). the points needing clarification are the most contentious ones:
the NC reaction to the whole thing, but particularly those two points, has been, predictably, something along the lines, of "bitch, please...".
it's only a matter of time until the whole thing falls apart. either
1) the UML-maoist coalition won't be able to reconcile their differences over implementation, and so won't form a government, and we end up back where we were, if not worse off, three weeks ago.
or, 2) they work out something that allows them to form a government, but wherein both parties save face...which will of course be so vague and full of loopholes that one party will eventually inevitably claim that the other party has failed to abide by the agreement. for instance: "on a rotational basis"? what does that even MEAN? the UML is saying it be only on the "basis of broad based consensus — contrary to the sixth provision that commits for “long-term cooperation between the two parties.”" they may work out something suitably agreeable, but when it comes time to hand over the reins, an excuse will be found not to do so. furthermore, even is the parties weren't so heavily factionalized, this seems logistically infeasible to me: a rotation over what length of time? do you form a new cabinet every time you switch over? (because that SURELY won't obstruct the duties of government or anything.)
or, 3) the agreement is somehow hammered out, clearly and unambiguously, through actual compromise, to the satisfaction of both the UML and the maoists. except now that they've gotten an even tentative and unstable agreement to the effect, i doubt the maoists would agree to anything other than the wholesale integration of the PLA as a separate force, and so point four will have to go in as is. this is totally antithetical to the absolute good of the professionalization of the security sector in peacebuilding, not to mention a COMPLETE spoiler when it comes to getting to constitution written. the NC and opposition parties will never ratify a statute under those circumstances.
and that's what's ultimately at stake here.
one thing that probably won't be covered in the international press, but is really important, is the way this whole incident embodies the factionalism that pervades the three major parties: UCPN-maoist, CPN-UML (united marxist-leninist), and NC (nepali congress). infighting among factions is a major reason for the chronic ineffectiveness of nepal's democratic government(s) since the early 1990's, and one of the original rallying cries of the maoist insurgency. at the moment, there are probably three major factions of the maoists, and 2-3 in the UML, depending on who's counting. the negotiation of the secret agreement by certain factions of each party can be seen as internal power plays by those factions, as well as a bid for control of government as a whole. this ktm post article gives a pretty good run down of the situation, although it's a little hard to follow if you're not familiar with the players.
the factionalism in play also makes this deal even more precarious than it already otherwise clearly is. as this other ktm post article describes, dahal and khanal have agreed to "clarify" the meaning of the seven points, under pressure from the opposition parties. they are ALSO under pressure from their respective parties to stand firm by the points as articulated (dahal's maoists) and to hedge their asses off (khanal's UML). the points needing clarification are the most contentious ones:
"The opposition to the accord mainly revolves around the fourth point, which commits to the formation of a separate force for Maoist combatants and the sixth point, which states that the UML and the Maoists will lead the government on a rotational basis."
the NC reaction to the whole thing, but particularly those two points, has been, predictably, something along the lines, of "bitch, please...".
it's only a matter of time until the whole thing falls apart. either
1) the UML-maoist coalition won't be able to reconcile their differences over implementation, and so won't form a government, and we end up back where we were, if not worse off, three weeks ago.
or, 2) they work out something that allows them to form a government, but wherein both parties save face...which will of course be so vague and full of loopholes that one party will eventually inevitably claim that the other party has failed to abide by the agreement. for instance: "on a rotational basis"? what does that even MEAN? the UML is saying it be only on the "basis of broad based consensus — contrary to the sixth provision that commits for “long-term cooperation between the two parties.”" they may work out something suitably agreeable, but when it comes time to hand over the reins, an excuse will be found not to do so. furthermore, even is the parties weren't so heavily factionalized, this seems logistically infeasible to me: a rotation over what length of time? do you form a new cabinet every time you switch over? (because that SURELY won't obstruct the duties of government or anything.)
or, 3) the agreement is somehow hammered out, clearly and unambiguously, through actual compromise, to the satisfaction of both the UML and the maoists. except now that they've gotten an even tentative and unstable agreement to the effect, i doubt the maoists would agree to anything other than the wholesale integration of the PLA as a separate force, and so point four will have to go in as is. this is totally antithetical to the absolute good of the professionalization of the security sector in peacebuilding, not to mention a COMPLETE spoiler when it comes to getting to constitution written. the NC and opposition parties will never ratify a statute under those circumstances.
and that's what's ultimately at stake here.
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